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The Victims' Bill Of Rights: Where Did
It Come From And How Much Did It
Do?
J. Clark Kelso* and Brigitte A. Bass**
INTRODUCTION
The past fifteen years in California have been witness to a most
remarkable and far reaching political and legal phenomenon. The
People of the State of California successfully employed the voter
initiative process to alter or entirely remake vast fields of
California's constitutional and statutory law, effectively bypassing
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.
Almost no field of law or branch of government went untouched
by these changes. State and local tax law and policy were
fundamentally changed by the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978.'
Stiff regulation of insurance companies and insurance rates was
created by Proposition 103.2 The hundred-year-old plus post-
indictment preliminary hearing in felony cases was abolished by
Proposition 115, the "Crime Victims Justice Reform Act," which
* Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I would
like to acknowledge the help of my research assistants in the preparation of this Article: Jennifer
Anderson, Joan Medeiros and Jill Malat.
** Director of Legal Publications, California District Attorneys Association. I want to thank
Cathy Karneszis for her help in the preparation of material for this Article.
1. CA. CONST. art. XII[A. The constitutionality of Proposition 13's acquisition-value
property tax system will be resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States this Term. A
California Court of Appeal upheld the system against Equal Protection and Right to Travel
challenges. Nordlinger v. Lynch, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 1265, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684, 687 (1990). The
California Supreme Court denied review on February 28, 1991. 1991 Cal. LEXIS 842 (LEXIS, Cal.
library, Cases file) (1991). The Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ of certiorari.
Nordinger, 112 S. CL 49 (Oct. 7, 1991).
2. Initiative Measure Proposition 103 (approved Nov. 8, 1988) (codified at CAL INs. CODE
§§ 750-67, 1643, 1850-1857.5, 1861.01, 12979 (West 1992).
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also enacted other significant procedural changes in the handling
of criminal cases.' Although not an exercise of the initiative
power, the People's rejection of three justices on the Supreme
Court of California in 1986 was clearly related to prior voter
initiatives respecting the death penalty. Most recently, the
legislature has been fundamentally restructured because of
Proposition 140.
4
The Victims' Bill of Rights, Proposition 8, must be considered
in the same class as the somewhat more famous initiatives
described above.' Enacted in 1982, Proposition 8 may not be as
well known to the public as Proposition 13, Proposition 103, or
Proposition 140, but its effects have been no less far-reaching. Both
in qualitative and quantitative terms, Proposition 8 made some of
the most fundamental changes ever seen in the handling of criminal
cases in California and created, virtually overnight, significant
rights for victims of crime.
Other articles in this issue concentrate on one or another of the
provisions of Proposition 8, and Jeff Brown's article, in particular,
3. Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, Initiative Measure Proposition 115 (approved June 5,
1990) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 14.1, 24, 29, 30; CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 223, 223.5
(West Supp. 1992); CAL Evi. CODE § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1992); CAL PENAL CODE §§ 189, 190.2,
190.41,190.5,206,206.1,859,866,871.6,872,954.1,987.05, 1049.5,1050.1, 1054, 1054.1, 1054.2,
1054.3,1054.4,1054.5,1054.6,1054.7, 1102.5,1102.7,1385.1,1430,1511 (West Supp. 1992)). See
Bowens v. Superior Court, I Cal. 4th 36, 49, 820 P.2d 600, 609, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 385 (1991)
(holding that Proposition 115 abolished post-indictment preliminary hearings); Whitman v. Superior
Court, 54 Cal. 3d 1063, 1074, 820 P.2d 262, 273, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160, 166 (1991) (upholding the
facial constitutionality of Proposition 115 provision permitting hearsay testimony at preliminary
hearings); Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 369, 815 P.2d 304, 314, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231,
239 (1991) (upholding the facial constitutionality of Proposition 115's provision granting reciprocal
discovery); Tapia v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 3d 282, 299, 807 P.2d 434,44, 279 Cal. Rptr. 592, 602
(1991) (upholding the retroactive application of Proposition 115); Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d
336, 349, 356, 801 P.2d 1077, 1085, 1090, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 334, 339 (1990) (upholding
Proposition 115 against single-subject and constitutional revision challenges).
4. Initiative Measure Proposition 140 (approved Nov. 6, 1990) (codified at CAL. CoNsT. art.
IV, §§ 2(a), 4.5, 7.5; id, art. XX, § 7).
5. Victims' Bill of Rights, Initiative Measure Proposition 8 (approved June 8,1982) (codified
at CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 28; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25, 667, 1191.1, 1192.7, 3043 (West 1988
& Supp. 1992); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1732.5, 1767, 6331 (West 1984)). See Brosnahan v.
Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 300-06, 651 P.2d 274, 314-320, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 70-76 (1982) (setting
forth the ballot pamphlet containing Proposition 8's text and the arguments and analysis regarding
the initiative).
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gives a good overview of all the initiative's provisions.' Part I of
this Article describes the most significant events that led up to the
passage of Proposition 8.' Part II attempts to assess in quantitative
terms the extent to which Proposition 8 changed the law in
California.' As will be discussed, the inspiration for Proposition 8
was a series of California Supreme Court decisions handed down
over a fifteen year period that expanded the rights of the accused
far beyond the requirements of the United States Constitution.
These decisions created what might be described as a "target-rich
environment" for the proponents of Proposition 8, and this
Article's quantitative analysis suggests that Proposition 8 squarely
hit its targets. This Article concludes that the Victims' Bill of
Rights has been, by this measure, entirely successful in
accomplishing what it set out to do.9
I. WHY PROPOSmIION 8 WAS APPROVED
The *political and legal landscape that was the seedbed of
Proposition 8 was formed by many different forces over a long
period of time. Although Proposition 8 changed the state
constitution, its history begins, interestingly enough, with a series
of decisions in the 1960's by the United States Supreme Court
interpreting the federal constitution. The leading case names and
holdings are by now familiar to most lawyers and, in at least one
case, to the public. In Mapp v. Ohio,"0 the Court overruled prior
cases" and imposed the exclusionary rule upon the states."
Gideon v. Wainwright3  guaranteed legal representation to
6. Brown, Proposition 8: Origins and Impact-A Public Defender's Perspective, 23 PAc. LJ.
891 (1992).
7. See infra notes 10-123 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 124-170 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954) (declining to apply the federal
exclusionary rule to illegally seized evidence in a state court prosecution); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 31 (1949) (holding that the fourth amendment does not forbid the admission of illegally
obtained evidence in a prosecution for a state crime in a state court).
12. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
13. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
845
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criminal defendants. 14 Fay v. Noia'5 broadened the availability
of the writ of habeas corpus.' 6 Finally, the Court handed down
Miranda v. Arizona,17 a decision whose holding has probably
become, through the medium of television, more familiar to the
public than the Pledge of Allegiance.
For purposes of Proposition 8, the importance of these cases
lies not so much in their particular holdings as in their exclusive
focus upon the rights and interests of the accused vis-a-vis the
state. For example, the very first sentence of Chief Justice
Warren's majority opinion in Miranda suggests that the accused is
the only person whose interests are of constitutional significance:
"The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our
concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society
must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in
prosecuting individuals for crime."' 8 Miranda and the cases cited
above can be searched in vain for any reference to the rights of
victims and potential victims to be protected from crime. The
Court's only apparent interest in these cases was in protecting
persons being prosecuted for crimes allegedly committed.
In retrospect, the Warren Court's actual influence in criminal
procedure was short-lived. With Nixon appointees Burger,
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist replacing Warren, Black, Fortas,
and Harlan, the openly liberal and activist Warren Court was
succeeded by the hold-the-line Burger Court.19 The Burger Court
14. 1& at 344.
15. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
16. Il at 440.
17. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. Id. at 439.
19. The change in personnel on the Court was not the only factor which led to a leveling off
in the rate of pro-defendant decisions. The Court's decisions in Miranda, In re Gault, and Katz v.
United States, combined with the social upheavals of the late 1960's, led to substantial public
criticism of the Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence, including passage by Congress of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197. See In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that juveniles have right to notice of charges, counsel,
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and privilege against self-incrimination); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that electronically listening and recording defendant's
statements made in a public telephone booth was a "'search and seizure" under the fourth
amendment, and required prior judicial sanction to comply with constitutional standards). This
criticism may have influenced the Warren Court during its final years to temper somewhat its earlier
846
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generally did not retreat from Warren Court decisions, but the
decade of expansions was clearly at an end.20
Faced with a United States Supreme Court that was increasingly
unwilling to entertain expansive readings of the fourth, fifth, and
sixth amendments, defense counsel and liberal interest groups
turned their attention away from the federal courts to the state
courts and state constitutions. The purely doctrinal basis for the
shift to state courts and state constitutions was unimpeachable.
State constitutions are independent expressions of state sovereignty.
The United States Constitution only limits the burdens that states
may impose upon citizens subject to a state's jurisdiction. Nothing
in the United States Constitution prohibits a state from granting
greater protections to an accused under state law than those granted
by the Constitution.2 Defense counsel and liberal interest groups
argued that state supreme courts have a constitutional obligation to
interpret their own constitutional provisions, and if those provisions
provide greater protection than the federal constitution, so be it.22
The primary difficulty in relying upon state constitutional
provisions as an independent source of substantive law is that many
state provisions are based upon, or are identical to, parallel
enthusiasm for the rights of the accused. See, e.g., Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The
Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 UNIV. ILI_ L.F. 518,538-40; Israel, Criminal Procedure,
The Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1320 (1977); Saltzburg,
Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger
Courts, 69 GEO. LJ. 151 (1980).
20. See Y. KAIIsARt, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger
Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in Tim BURGER
COURT - THE COUNTER-REvoLUTION THAT WASN'T 62-91 (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
21. It is clear that a state court may not grant greater protections to an accused under the
federal constitution than have been granted by the United States Supreme Court. Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (stating that "a State may not impose ... greater restrictions [upon law
enforcement] as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from
imposing them").
22. The secondary literature discussing the independent vitality of state constitutions is quite
extensive. One of the most complete explorations of the topic is found in a symposium published by
the Texas Law Review. See The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 959-1338
(1985). The contributors to the symposium included, most significantly for purposes of this Article,
Justice Stanley Mosk of the California Supreme Court. Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal
and Conservative, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1081 (1985). Justice Mosk noted that "[f]or the liberal, there is
the prospect of continued expansion of individual rights and liberties; the work of the Warren Court
can be carried on at the state level." Mosk, supra, at 1081.
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provisions in the United States Constitution.23 Applying ordinary
rules of interpretation, these provisions should have been given a
construction consistent with the federal provisions upon which they
were based. Lawyers have been trained, however, to take seriously
Humpty-Dumpty's claim that words can mean whatever the speaker
(or the reader) wants them to mean. That a state constitutional
provision was identical to the fourth amendment was little more
than an inconvenience. The identity in language did not prevent
defense counsel from arguing for greater protections under state
constitutions and did not prevent willing and sympathetic state
courts in some jurisdictions from accepting those arguments and
basing expansive protections of the accused upon clearly
independent state grounds.24
The Supreme Court of California was one of those state courts
willing to ignore the decisions of the Burger Court and base
conflicting decisions upon adequate and independent state grounds.
One of the earliest and best examples is found in People v.
Brisendine.'z In Brisendine, the defendant was camping with
others in the Deep Creek area of the San Bernardino National
Forest.26 Two deputy sheriffs patrolling the area arrested the
campers for having an open campfire in violation of county law.2
Since any type of camping was prohibited in the specific area
where the defendants were found, the officers requested that the
campers pack up their gear and accompany the officers back to
their vehicle, which was located about a half-mile away.28 The
officers did not intend to book the campers or arrest them; they
were simply going to issue citations for violation of the open fire
23. Compare, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (state search and seizure clause) with U.S. CoNST.
amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures).
24. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). A state court may insulate its expansive
decisions from federal review and reversal under Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), by making
.. a 'plain statement' that [its] decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds." Long,
463 U.S. at 1042.
25. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
26. Id at 532, 531 P.2d at 1101, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
27. Id at 533, 531 P.2d at 1101, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
28. Id
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ordinance.29 In preparation for the half-mile hike back to the
officers' vehicle, the officers conducted a weapons search of the
campers." The search extended to a knapsack owned by the
defendant.3 When squeezing the knapsack did not disclose its
likely contents, one of the officers opened the knapsack and began
to search the contents.32 The officer found marijuana in a small,
frosted plastic bottle and envelopes containing tablets of illegal
drugs wrapped in tinfoil.3
The critical issue for the court to decide was whether the search
of the bottle and envelopes exceeded the constitutionally
permissible scope. 4 The defendant argued that since no weapons
could conceivably have been found in either the small bottle or the
envelopes, a search of those objects was constitutionally
impermissible." The People argued that the search of the
containers was permissible because no additional justification, such
as probable cause to believe the objects concealed weapons, was
necessary once the officers began a constitutionally permissible
search incident to taking the defendant into custody. 6
Among other relevant state cases, the defendant in Brisendine
cited People v. Superior Court (Simon),37 where the Supreme
Court of California held that a full body search incident to an
ordinary traffic arrest was constitutionally impermissible unless the
officer had reason to suspect weapons would be discovered or
feared for his or her own safety.38 The People relied upon two
29. Id
30. Id
31. Id at 533, 531 P.2d at 1102, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
32. Id
33. Id
34. Id at 538, 531 P.2d at 1102, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
35. Id
36. Id at 539, 531 P.2d at 1103, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
37. 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972).
38. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 536,531 P.2d at 1103, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 319. See Simon, 7 Cal.
3d at 186, 496 P.2d at 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 837. In Simon, the search of the defendant had
revealed a plastic bag containing marijuana in the defendant's right front pants pocket. Id at 191,496
P.2d at 1209, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 841. The Simon court quoted with approval the following language
from People v. Superior Court (Kiefer), 3 Cal. 3d 807, 829, 478 P.2d 449, 464, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729,
744 (1970): "[A] warrantless search for weapons, like a search for contraband, must be predicated
in traffic violation cases on specific facts or circumstances giving the officer reasonable grounds to
849
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recent United States Supreme Court decisions, United States v.
Robinson39 and Gustafson v. Florida,' where the Court held that
the fourth amendment was not violated by a full body search
incident to a traffic arrest in which illegal drugs were found on the
defendant's person.41
In Brisendine, the Supreme Court of California recognized that
the searches in Robinson and Gustafson were essentially
indistinguishable from the search of the defendant's knapsack, and
that adherence to Robinson and Gustafson would require an
affirmance of the defendant's conviction.42 In an opinion written
by Justice Mosk,43 the court rejected Robinson and Gustafson and
retained the Simon approach under California's version of the
fourth amendment." Justice Mosk's opinion in Brisendine set
forth, in relatively complete terms, the argument that would in
future cases form the basis for ignoring other Burger Court
pronouncements. Therefore, Brisendine is worthy of close perusal.
Justice Mosk began by observing that the Supreme Court of the
United States had itself noted the states' power to impose more
rigorous search and seizure standards than are required by the
federal constitution.45 The next step was to note that the Supreme
Court of California "has always assumed the independent vitality
of our state Constitution."46
believe that such weapons are present in the vehicle he has stopped." Id at 206, 496 P.2d at 1216,
101 Cal. Rptr. at 849. The court then extended that reasoning to a pat-down search of the driver. d
39. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
40. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
41. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at545,531 P.2d at 1110, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 326. See Gustafson, 414
U.S. at 266; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. Robinson involved heroin found in a crumpled cigarette
package. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 223. Gustafson involved marijuana found inside a cigarette box.
Gusrafson, 414 U.S. at 262.
42. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 547,531 P.2d at 1110, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 326. After discussing
Robinson and Gustafson, the court noted that "It]he Supreme Court has taken like facts and reached
a contrary result." Id at 547, 531 P.2d at 1111, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
43. Justice Mosk has been one of the leading proponents of the independent vitality of the
California Constitution. See Mosk, supra note 22, at 1081.
44. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 536,531 P.2d at 1111, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 326. See CAL. CoNST.
art. I, § 13 (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures).
45. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 548, 531 P.2d at 1111, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (citing Jankovich
v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comrnn, 379 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1965)).
46. Bridendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 548, 531 P.2d at 1112, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
850
1992 / The Victim's Bill of Rights
So far, so good; both propositions cited by Justice Mosk are
incontrovertible. The critical issue, of course, was not whether the
Supreme Court of California had the power to interpret the
California Constitution differently from the federal constitution --
that power surely exists -- but whether the court should exercise
that power.
If the language of article I, section 13 of the California
Constitution and the apparent intent of the drafters of that section
meant anything, the court should have concluded that the state
search and seizure clause was coextensive with the fourth
amendment. Article I, section 13 provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be
violated; and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to.be
searched and the persons and things to be seized 7
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.48
If the near identity in language was not enough to convince a
court that the California provision was modeled upon the federal
provision, there is the commentary of a delegate to the 1849
California Constitutional Convention that the California counterpart
to the fourth amendment "was word for word from the
Constitution of the United States, 4th article."
49
47. CAL CONST. art I, § 13.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
49. BROWNE, REPORT Op THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENION OF CALiORNiA (1849) (quoted
in Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 555 n.3, 531 P.2d at 1102 n.3, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 318 n.3 (Burke, J.,
dissenting)).
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The Supreme Court of California had previously recognized the
obvious implication to be drawn from the similarity in language
and the drafting history of the California search and seizure
provision. As recently as four years prior to the decision in
Brisendine, the court had this to say about the relationship between
the fourth amendment and California's search and seizure clause:
Since sections 19 and 13 of article I of the California Constitution are
substantially equivalent to the Fourth Amendment and to the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution respectively, our analysis of the validity of the claim
and delivery law in respect to the above provisions of the federal
Constitution is applicable in respect to the above sections of the state
Constitution.50
Justice Mosk began his attack upon common sense and prior
cases in Brisendine by claiming that the court had previously
departed from the fourth amendment in interpreting California's
search and seizure clause and had granted the accused greater
rights than existed under federal law.51 Justice Mosk cited People
v. Martin52 and its California progeny for this proposition.53 In
Martin, which was decided before the Supreme Court of the United
States made the federal exclusionary rule binding upon the
states,54 the court adopted the so-called "vicarious exclusionary
rule" under which the defendant is permitted to assert the search
and seizure rights of a third person.55 The Supreme Court of the
United States subsequently rejected the vicarious exclusionary rule
in Alderman v. United States.1
6
50. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 270 n.6, 486 P.2d 1242, 1251 n.6, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 51
n.6 (1971). See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 438, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955) (stating that "[a]n
essentially identical guarantee of personal privacy [as that provided by the Fourth Amendment] is set
forth in Article I, section 19 of the California Constitution").
51. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 548, 531 P.2d at 1112, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
52. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
53. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 548, 531 P.2d at 1112,119 Cal. Rptr at 328.
54. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Martin was decided in 1955. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d
755, 290 P.2d 855.
55. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d at 760, 290 P.2d at 857.
56. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
852
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According to Justice Mosk, the critical case in which the
Supreme Court of California supposedly departed from Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence was Kaplan v. Superior Court,57
decided in 1971 after Alderman was handed down."8 Justice
Mosk's reliance upon Kaplan is flawed. The court in Kaplan held,
in an opinion authored by Justice Mosk, that the recently amended
section 351 of the California Evidence Code incorporated the
Martin rule as a matter of statutory interpretation. 59 The Kaplan
court explicitly disclaimed an intention to base its decision upon
the California Constitution:
This conclusion [that section 351 preserves the Martin rule] makes it
unnecessary for us to reach defendant's constitutional arguments that (1)
the Martin rule is required by the search and seizure clause of article I,
section 19, of the California Constitution .... 60
Kaplan was Justice Mosk's only California authority in the
Brisendine opinion for the proposition that California's search and
seizure provision had been interpreted more broadly than the fourth
amendment, and Kaplan was insufficient to the task.
Justice Mosk's only other argument in favor of construing the
California search and seizure clause more broadly than the fourth
amendment rewrites the intent of the framers of the California
Constitution. Justice Mosk expressed the following:
It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions
textually identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their
57. 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
58. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 548, 531 P.2d at 1112, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
59. Kaplan, 6 Cal. 3d at 159, 491 P.2d at 5, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 654. The version of section 351
quoted in Kaplan provided that "'[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is
admissible." CAL. Evm. CODE § 351 (West 1966). The court's comment to section 351 explained
that the section" 'abolishes all limitations on the admissibility of relevant evidence except those that
are based on a statute, including a constitutional provision.' ' Kaplan, 6 Cal.3d at 160, 491 P.2d at
7, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 656 (quoting CAL. Ev. CODE § 351 Comment) (The court concluded that the
Martin rule was "based upon" constitutional provisions (including the fourth amendment) even
though it was not a rule "'required by" the fourth amendment). Id at 161, 491 P.2d at 7, 98 Cal.
Rptr. at 656.
60. Id. at 161 n.9, 491 P.2d at 8 n.9, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 656 n.9.
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federal counterpart. The lesson of history is otherwise: the Bill of Rights
was based ipon the corresponding provisions of the first state
constitutions, rather than the reverse.61
Justice Mosk's version of history and its relation to resolution
of the issue presented in Brisendine is topsy-turvy. In the first
place, the historical basis for the Bill of Rights was not the issue
in Brisendine; the basis for California's search and seizure
provision should have been the focus. Second, the "fiction" that
Mosk describes was fact in California. As noted above, the
delegates to the California Constitutional Convention used the
fourth amendment virtually "word for word" as the basis for
California's search and seizure clause. 2 Justice Mosk never
explains how this drafting history can be squared with giving
California's search and seizure clause an interpretation at odds with
the fourth amendment.
63
Justice Mosk's final authority in Brisendine was a decision of
the Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Kaluna.' The Hawaii
Constitution, like the California Constitution, contained a search
and seizure clause essentially identical to the fourth amendment.65
The Hawaii Supreme Court, with no analysis of the language or
drafting history of the Hawaii Constitution, simply asserted its
power to interpret provisions of the Hawaii Constitution differently
from the federal constitution.' If essentially unreasoned opinions
are authority, then Justice Mosk certainly found authority in
Kaluna.
61. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 550, 531 P.2d at 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
62. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
63. Justice Mosk rather awkwardly ducked this central inquiry with the following:"We need
not further extend this opinion to trace to their remote origins the historical roots of state
constitutional provisions. Yet we have no doubt that such inquiry would confirm our view of the
matter." Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 550, 531 P.2d at 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329. It was, of course,
easier for the court to "have no doubt" when it refused to conduct the inquiry into the state's
constitutional history. Given the importance of the issue, the People of California would surely not
have objected to a "'further extendled]" opinion.
64. 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974).
65. Compare HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7, with U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
66. See Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d at 55.
854
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When all is said and done, Brisendine firmly established the
fundamental principle that California's search and seizure clause
meant whatever the Supreme Court of California said it meant, and
in interpreting that clause, the Supreme Court of California would
be guided by neither the language nor the history of the clause.
Rather, the court would be guided only by its own sense of what
it considered "reasonable" and how "unreasonable" searches
could be most effectively deterred.
As the Supreme Court of California increasingly departed from
United States Supreme Court precedent, it opened itself up to the
charge that California law had run amuck and that dramatic
changes, such as Proposition 8, were needed. For example, in the
search and seizure context, the Supreme Court of California gave
us the following decisions, among others. First, in People v.
Krivda,67 the court held that a warrantless search of a trash
container placed adjacent to the street for pickup violated the
defendant's rights, and that the fruits of that search were
inadmissible.6 In People v. Superior Court (Hawkins),69 the
court held that a lawful arrest was a necessary prerequisite to
requiring a suspect to take a blood test, and that probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed for which a blood test
would be relevant, such as driving under the influence, was
constitutionally insufficient to justify the test.70 Finally, in People
v. Longwill,71 the court held that a full body search of a person
who was not necessarily going to be incarcerated, but who was
67. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971).
68. Id. at 365,486 P.2d at 1267,96 Cal. Rptr. at 67. Krivda was overruled by Proposition 8,
insofar as it relied upon the state constitution, and was overruled by California v. Greenwood 486
U.S. 35 (1988), insofar as it relied upon the federal constitution. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 44.
69. 6 Cal. 3d 757, 493 P.2d 1145, 100 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1972).
70. Id. at 763, 498 P.2d at 1149, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 285. The court's holding was contrary to
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,295-96 (1973) (holding that police were justified in taking scrapings
from a suspect's fingernails where probable cause existed to believe he had committed a murder,
even though the suspect was not arrested), and Schmnerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966)
(holding that an arrestee may be required to take a blood test where probable cause existed to believe
that he had been driving under the influence). Proposition 8 abrogated Hawkins. People v. Trotman,
214 Cal. App. 3d 430, 432, 262 Cal. Rptr. 640, 641 (1989); People v. Deltoro, 214 Cal. App. 3d
1417, 1422, 263 Cal. Rptr. 305, 308 (1989).
71. 14 Cal. 3d 943, 538 P.2d 753, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1975).
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under custodial arrest, was impermissible and that evidence found
pursuant to such a search must be suppressed.72
In the area of admissions and confessions, the Supreme Court
of California gave us the following decisions. In People v.
Disbrow,73  the court held that a defendant's extrajudicial
statements elicited in violation of Miranda were inadmissible for
impeachment purposes.74 In People v. Jimenez, 5 the court held
that the People had the obligation to prove the voluntariness of the
defendant's confession beyond a reasonable doubt.76 In People v.
Pettingill,77 the court held that once a suspect had invoked his
Miranda right to remain silent, any police-initiated interrogation
whatsoever violated his privilege against self-incrimination.78
72. Id. at 945, 538 P.2d at 754, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 298. The court's holding was contrary to
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (holding that a police officer was entitled to make
a full search, incident to arrest, of defendant's person and cigarette package found thereupon, even
though the officer had no subjective fear that the defendant was armed), and United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that a search of the defendant's person and cigarette
package found thereupon did not violate the fourth amendment where the officer had probable cause
to arrest the defendant). Proposition 8 abrogated Longwill. In re Demetrius A., 208 Cal. App. 3d
1245, 1247, 256 Cal. Rptr. 717, 718 (1989). See People v. Otto, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 277 Cal.
Rptr. 596, 602-03 (1991), review granted, 280 Cal. Rptr. 91, 808 P.2d 234, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 1648
(LEXIS, CaL library, Cases file) (April 15, 1991), reprinted for tracking pending review, 233 Cal.
App. 3d 279 (1991) (Sixth District Court of Appeal of California decision finding Longwill has been
abrogated by Proposition 8). The court's grant of review in Otto is limited to the issue of
admissibility of tape recordings the victim made of telephone conversations between the defendants.
Otto, 280 Cal. Rptr. 91, 808 P.2d 234, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 1648 (LEXIS, Cal. library, Cases file).
73. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
74. IL at 113,545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368. The court's holding was contrary to the
federal rule which permits such statements to be used for purposes of impeachment. Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971). Proposition 8 abrogated Disbrow. People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d
309, 311, 748 P.2d 307, 307-08, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369, 369-70 (1988).
75. 21 Cal. 3d 595, 580 P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978).
76. Id. at 608,580 P.2d at 679, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 179. The federal rule requires only proof by
a preponderance of the evidence that a confession was voluntary. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,
489 (1972). Proposition 8 abrogated Jimenez. People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 65, 775 P.2d 1042,
1043, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 274 (1989).
77. 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978).
78. Id. at 251,578 P.2d at 121, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 874. The court's holding was contrary to the
federal rule. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 107 (1975) (holding that interrogation by
police two hours after the defendant had invoked his Miranda right to remain silent did not violate
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination where the defendant's previous refusal to speak
was "scrupulously honored" and where defendant received a readmonition of his Miranda rights).
Proposition 8 abrogated Pettingill. People v. Harris, 211 Cal. App. 3d 640, 647, 259 Cal. Rptr. 462,
465 (1989); People v. Warner, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1122, 1124, 250 Cal. Rptr. 462, 463 (1988).
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Of course, the California Supreme Court's pro-defendant rulings
were not limited to constitutional issues. In People v. Drew,79 the
court rejected the two-pronged M'Naghten test of insanity as a
criminal defense"0 and replaced it with the American Law
Institute's test,81 which is generally more favorable to mentally
disordered defendants.8" In a series of cases beginning with
People v. Beagle,83 the court imposed relatively strict limits upon
the circumstances in which trial courts could admit evidence of
prior convictions for impeachment purposes.84
In two instances, the court's decisions created such an outcry
that the court was prompted to reconsider. In People v. Tanner,85
the court held in a four to three decision that the "use-a-gun, go-
to-prison" law, which provided generally that "[p]robation shall
not be granted to ... any person who uses a firearm during the
79. 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978).
80. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843) (defining the test for insanity as a
question of whether the defendant did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or,
if he did know what he was doing, whether he did not know that what he was doing was wrong).
81. MODE. PENAL CODE § 4.01 (proposed Official Draft 1962).
82. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d at 338,583 P.2d at 1320, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 276. Proposition 8 overruled
Drew and reinstated the M'Naghten test. CAL. PE r.A. CODE § 25(b) (enacted by Proposition 8).
Section 25(b) of the Penal Code provides as follows:
In any criminal proceeding, including any juvenile court proceeding, in which a plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall be found by the trier of fact
only when the accused person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she
was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and
of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the comraissiop of the offense.
Id
83. 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972).
84. See People v. Barrick, 33 Cal. 3d 115,130,654 P.2d 1243,1249,187 Cal. Rptr. 716,724
(1982); People v. Spearman, 25 Cal. 3d 107, 117, 599 P.2d 74, 76-77, 157 Cal. Rptr. 883, 887
(1979); People v. Fries, 24 Cal. 3d 222, 230-31, 594 P.2d 19, 22, 155 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200 (1979);
People v. Woodard, 23 Cal. 3d 329, 338, 590 P.2d 391, 395, 152 Cal. Rptr. 536, 540-41 (1979);
People v. Rollo, 20 Cal. 3d 109, 117, 569 P.2d 771, 776, 141 Cal. Rptr. 177, 180 (1977); People v.
Rist, 16 Cal. 3d 211, 220, 545 P.2d 833, 839, 127 Cal. Rptr. 457, 463 (1976); People v. Antick, 15
Cal. 3d 79,98-99,539 P.2d 43,55-56, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 487-88 (1975). A trial court has discretion
to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value. CAL.
EViD. CODE § 352 (West Supp. 1992).
85. 23 Cal. 3d 16, 587 P.2d 1112, 151 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1978), vacated, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 596
P.2d 328, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979).
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commission" of certain listed crimes, 6 was discretionary rather
than mandatory and did not abrogate the trial court's inherent
discretion to strike a charge under section 1385 of the Penal
Code.7 After extraordinary public criticism, the court, in an
extremely unusual order, granted a motion for rehearing, vacated
its prior opinion, and, because Justice Mosk changed his vote, held
that the use-a-gun, go-to-prison law was mandatory.18 In another
flip-flop, the court first held in People v. McGaughran"9 that a
police officer could not run a routine warrant check upon a driver
validly stopped for a traffic offense absent "specific and articulable
facts causing [the officer] to reasonably suspect that there may be
an outstanding warrant for the driver's arrest.'9  Following
another storm of protest, the court granted a motion for rehearing,
vacated its prior opinion, and modified its reasoning to permit a
routine warrant check so long as the check is conducted within
"the period of time necessary [for the officer] to discharge the
duties that he incurs by virtue of the traffic stop."'"
The cases just described had the effect of damaging the
credibility of the Supreme Court of California in criminal matters,
at least in the eyes of a large segment of California's population.
These were cases that made headlines, in part because of the cases
86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.06 (West Supp. 1992). George Deukmejian was an author of
this statute when he was a state senator. SENAT FINAL HISTORY 1975-1976 at 161 (setting forth
legislative history of S.B. 278, chaptered Sept. 23, 1975 as 1975 CAL. STAT. ch. 1004, § 2, at 2357
(enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.06)). Deukmejian would later as Governor become a supporter
of Proposition 8.
87. Tanner, 587 P.2d at 1124, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 311. The lead opinion by Justice Tobriner
garnered only three votes. Clief Justice Bird concurred separately on the ground that the enactment
of Penal Code section 1203.06 violated the Separation of Powers principle. Id. at 1124, 151 Cal. Rptr.
at 311 (Bird, CJ., concurring and dissenting).
83. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 537, 596 P.2d 328, 342, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450, 464 (1979).
89. 22 Cal. 3d 469, 585 P.2d 206, 149 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1978), vacated, 25 Cal. 3d 577, 601
P.2d 207, 159 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1979).
90. 585 P.2d at 208, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 586.
91. McGaughran, 25 Cal. 3d 577, 584, 601 P.2d 207, 214, 159 Cal. Rptr. 191, 194 (1979).
With modem technology, most warrant checks can now be completed in a few minutes, well within
the time that it ordinarily takes to carry out the usual functions incident to a traffic stop. Id. at 584
n.6, 601 P.2d at 209 n.6, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 195 n.6. The detention in McGaughran for the warrant
check was an atypical 10 minutes, and because the officer never intended to ticket the driver (but
intended only to give a warning), the court held that the particular detention in McGaughran was
unlawful. Id, at 587, 601 P.2d at 215, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
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themselves, and in part because of the public reactions to the cases
by highly placed government officials.
The court's credibility was further and most seriously eroded
in capital cases. Perhaps more than with any other criminal justice
issue, the California Supreme Court's handling of the death penalty
engendered deeply rooted electoral hostility. The public was
overwhelmingly in favor of the death penalty, while the court was
openly hostile to the death penalty and, as a result, indirectly
hostile to the electorate. The initial round in this battle came in
1972 when, in People v. Anderson,92 the court struck down
California's death penalty statute as violative of article I, section 6
of the California Constitution. 93 The voters responded that very
same year with an initiative overruling Anderson.9'
The year 1972 also saw the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Furman v. Georgia,5 where the Court struck down
death penalty statutes that granted too much discretion to the
sentencing authority.96 The California Legislature responded to
92. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
93. Id. at 634,493 P.2d at 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155. Article I, section 6 provided as follows:
All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the
proof is evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fmes imposed; nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted. Witnesses
shall not be unreasonably detained, nor confined in any room where criminals are actually
imprisoned.
CAL CONsT. art. I, § 6. The eighth amendment to the federal constitution provides, "'Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.'" U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. The court in Anderson held that California's constitution imposed a stricter
standard than imposed by the eighth amendment because section 6 prohibited "cruel or unusual"
punishments while the eighth amendment prohibited only "cruel and unusual" punishments.
Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 634-39, 493 P.2d at 888, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
94. Initiative Measure Proposition 17 (approved Nov. 7, 1972) (codified at CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 27). Article , section 27 of the California Constitution provides as follows:
All statutes of this state in effect on February 17, 1972 [the date of the Anderson
decision], requiring, authorizing, imposing, or relating to the death penalty are in full force
and effect, subject to legislative amendment or repeal by statute, initiative, or referendum.
... The death penalty provided for under those statutes shall not be deemed to be, or to
constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual punishments within the meaning of Article I,
Section 6, nor shall such punishment for such offenses be deemed to contravene any other
provision of this constitution.
CAL CONST. art. , § 27.
95. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
96. Il at 313.
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Furman by enacting a new death penalty statute. 97 This statute
was subsequently declared unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment by a unanimous Supreme Court of California in
Rockwell v. Superior Court,98  because of the statute's
incompatibility with a series of United States Supreme Court
decisions in the mid-1970's.99 The California Legislature enacted
another death penalty statute,"° and this statute was upheld in
People v. Frierson.'0'
The People of California had also been working on a new death
penalty statute, which was approved in 1978.102 Despite prodding
by both the legislature and the People, the Supreme Court of
California managed from 1977 until the passage of Proposition 8
in 1982 to reverse the imposition of the death penalty in twenty-
two cases and affirm only two such convictions."0 3
97. 1973 Cal. Stat. ch. 719, §§ 4-6, at 1298-1300. The text of this statute can be seen in
Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 424 n.l, 556 P.2d 1101, 1103 n.1, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650,
652 n.1 (1976).
98. 18 Cal. 3d 420,556 P.2d 1101, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1976).
99. Id at 445,556 P.2d at 1116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 665. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
207 (1976) (upholding Georgia's statutory death penalty system since it narrowed the class of
murders subject to the death penalty and provided for a bifurcated proceeding and automatic appeal
to the state supreme court); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976) (upholding Florida's
statutory death penalty procedures which required the judge to consider specific aggravating and
mitigating factors and provided for state supreme court review); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276
(1976) (upholding Texas's capital sentencing procedure which required the jury to consider five
categories of aggravating circumstances and focused on the particularized circumstances of the
individual offense and offender); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (upholding
Louisiana*s death penalty scheme which narrowly defined five categories of first-degree murder and
which required mandatory jury instruction in first-degree murder cases on manslaughter and second-
degree murder).
100. 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 316, §§ 5, 7, 9, 11, at 1256-58 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190,
190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, 190.5).
101. 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979).
102. Initiative Measure Proposition 7 (approved Nov. 7, 1978) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 190-190.5) (West Supp. 1992).
103. The court affirmed the death penalty convictions in People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935,623
P.2d 240, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1981), and People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 603 (1980). The court struck down death penalty sentences in the following cases: People v.
Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983); People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d
21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982); People v. Gzikowski, 32 Cal. 3d 580, 651 P.2d 1145,
186 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1982); Ramos v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 26, 648 P.2d 589, 184 Cal. Rptr.
622 (1982); People v. Stankewitz, 32 Cal. 3d 80, 648 P.2d 578, 184 Cal. Rptr. 611 (1982); People
v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 797,647 P.2d 76,183 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1982); People v. Hogan, 31 Cal.
3d 815, 647 P.2d 93, 183 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1982); People v. Haskett, 30 Cal. 3d 841, 640 P.2d 776,
860
1992 / The Victim's Bill of Rights
Turning from the primarily judicial to the primarily political
side of history, the first glimmerings of what would become the
Victims' Bill of Rights can be seen in April of 1977, when
Governor Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown, Attorney General Evelle J.
Younger, Senator George Deukmejian, Assemblyman Alister
McAlister, and countless law enforcement officials and
organizations, at the prompting of the California District Attorneys
Association, observed California's first Victims' Rights Week. This
annual event is now in its sixteenth year.
Many of the California Supreme Court's unpopular rulings were
based upon the California Constitution, and only a constitutional
amendment could overrule those decisions. Proponents of reform
met with stiff opposition in the California Legislature and,
particularly, in the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee, even on
non-constitutionally based issues."0 4 In these circumstances, the
180 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1982); People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266
(1982), revd, 463 U.S. 992 (1983); People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 738 (1981); People v. Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d 739, 621 P.2d 837, 170 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1981); Hovey
v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980); People v. Thompson, 27
Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1980); People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468,
164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980); People v. Lanphear, 26 Cal. 3d 814, 608 P.2d 689, 163 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1980); People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 606 P.2d 341, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1980); People v.
Cruz, 26 Cal. 3d 233,605 P.2d 830, 162 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142,599
P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979); People v. Teron, 23 Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1979); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); People v.
Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595, 580 P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978); People v. McClary, 20 Cal. 3d
218, 571 P.2d 620, 142 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1977).
Subsequent to Proposition 8's enactment, the California Supreme Court struck down portions
of the death penalty initiative and, in other cases, managed to find some constitutional violation in
the specific manner in which the penalty-phase jury was instructed. See, e.g., People v. Davenport,
41 Cal. 3d 247, 710 P.2d 861,221 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1985); People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d
440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985); People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309
(1983); People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982); People v.
Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
In 1986, the People refused to reconfirm three justices largely because of the public perception
that these justices were an obstacle to enforcement of the death penalty. See Paonita, Voters in 3
States Reject ChiefJustices, The Nat'l Law L, Nov. 17, 1986, at 3.
104. See Criminal Justice Committee May Be Abolished, Sacramento Union, Dec. 16, 1980,
Metro Today, at 1; Otten, Tougher Crime Bills In Legislative Limbo, Sacramento Union, Apr. 17,
1979, at A3; Cook, Assembly Criminal Justice Committee: Pitfall Of Controversy, San Jose Post -
Recorder, Aug. 31, 1979, at 1; Moscone Says Bills Run Into 'Blockade,' Tri-valley News, Aug. 29,
1975, at 3; Otten, Senator Rips Assembly Unit As A 'Danger To The People,' Sacramento Union,
Aug. 8, 1978, at A6.
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initiative process stood out as the only remaining vehicle for
achieving the reforms being sought. The first attempt to use that
process began in 1977 immediately after the first Victims' Rights
Week. Assemblymen Alister McAlister and Dave Stirling, and
Senators Robert B. Presley and Jim Nielsen, in cooperation with
the California District Attorneys Association, began pursuit of a
criminal justice initiative, which was, in many respects, a precursor
of Propositions 8 and 115. This first effort failed because
insufficient funding and inadequate political organization prevented
the sponsors from securing the requisite number of signatures to
qualify the measure for the ballot.
Ironically, one of the most important events in the history of
Proposition 8 had nothing to do with the criminal justice system.
In 1978, the decade of the initiative began with the shocking and
spectacular success of Proposition 13, the Jarvis-Gann property tax
initiative.0 5 Proposition 13's success was a clear signal that even
extraordinarily fundamental changes in state law could be achieved
through the voter initiative process if the proponents of the
initiative were (1) sufficiently financed, (2) sufficiently organized,
and (3) tied to an emotional issue of concern to every citizen.
Proposition 13 thus held out to other groups the promise and
possibility of significant reform through voter initiatives.
April 22, 1981 marks the beginning of specific efforts that
would lead directly to the enactment of Proposition 8. Paul Gann,
who along with Howard Jarvis had pushed through Proposition 13,
joined Republican legislators in public criticism of the Assembly
Criminal Justice Committee and warned Democratic legislators that
criminal justice reform would be achieved through a Victims' Bill
of Rights if several then-pending legislative proposals were not
enacted. 1"6
]In late May of 1981, drafting for the Victims' Bill of Rights
began in earnest. The principal drafters were Senator John
Doolittle, Senator Alister McAlister, and Senior Assistant Attorney
862
105. CAL. CONST. art. XIIA (enacted by Proposition 113).
106. GOP Issues Ultimatum on Anti-Crime Legislation, San Diego Union, Apr. 23, 1981, at
A-3, col. I.
1992 / The Victim's Bill of Rights
General George Nicholson, who for years had been working
publicly and behind-the-scenes for criminal justice reform. Special
Assistant Attorney General Rodney Blonien was also a key player
in the drafting, and significant contributions were made by other
legislators and lawyers.
On June 9, 1981, after the legislature failed to adopt criminal
justice reform measures satisfactory to the proponents of reform,
Paul Gann submitted to the attorney general the text of the
Victims' Bill of Rights.1 7 Gann announced on June 18, 1981,
that he had bipartisan support, which included eight senators and
twenty-four assembly members, for a Victims' Bill of Rights.
1 8
Initiative support committees were also formed in August."0
Proposition 8 almost did not make it to the ballot. In order to
qualify, proponents needed to submit 553,790 valid signatures to
the Secretary of State, March Fong Eu.10 The proponents
submitted petitions containing 663,409 signatures.' Based upon
a five percent random sampling of the petitions,112 the Secretary
of State determined that the proponents had secured 108.76% of the
required number of signatures. 1 3 State law at that time required
that, if the statistical sampling method was used to verify the
validity of signatures, the proponent had to submit 110% of the
number of signatures required."' Secretary Eu initially refused to
107. Gann Crime Bill Aimed at Ballot, Sacramento Bee, June 10, 1981, at A13, col. 1.
108. Press Release, People's Advocate Inc., (June 18, 1981) (copy on file at Pacific Law
Journal).
109. The Citizen's Committee to Stop Crime was chaired by Gann and included as members
Senators Jim Nielsen and John Doolittle, former head of the Los Angeles Office of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Ted Gunderson, and Senior Assistant Attorney General George Nicholson.
A statewide initiative support committee was also formed, with San Francisco Board of Supervisor
Quentin Kopp as Northern California Chair and San Diego Mayor Pete Wilson as Southern California
Chair. Co-chairpersons on this committee included Senator William Campbell, Assembly members
Alister McAlister and Carol Hallett, and George Nicholson. Campaign Launched for "Victirs'
Rights" Initiative, Metropolitan News, Sept. 28, 1981, at 2.
110. Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 3,641 P.2d 200,200, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 100 (1982). See
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b) (initiative measures may be proposed by presenting the Secretary of State
with petition setting forth text of proposed statute or constitutional amendment, signed by 5% of the
states electors in case of statute and 8% in case of constitutional amendment).
I 11. Brosnahan, 31 Cal. 3d at 2, 641 P.2d at 200, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
112. See CAL. CoNsT. art. 11, § 8 (California's initiative provision).
113. Brosnahan, 31 CaL 3d at 3, 641 P.2d at 200, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
114. l
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certify the initiative and instead ordered local election officials to
verify each signature, an expensive and time-consuming
process.115 The proponents filed suit to compel the Secretary to
certify the initiative, and the suit resulted in an order that the
proponents had "substantially complied" with the Elections Code
and that the initiative should be certified for the June ballot.
116
The proponents of Proposition 8 worked not only in the courts,
but also in the legislature, to ensure that Proposition 8 would
appear on the June ballot. The proponents were able to push
through the legislature an urgency measure, which in effect,
reduced the statistical requirement from 110% to 105%.117 As
drafted, the measure applied only to Proposition 8.118
In the meantime, the lawsuit quickly came before the Supreme
Court of California. Oral argument was held on March 9, 1982, and
on March 11, 1982, the court released its per curiam opinion in
Brosnahan v. Eu.u 9 The court recited the facts, including the
statute reducing to 105% the number of required signatures, and,
without identifying any reason for the decision, simply
"conclude[d] that the initiative measure should be placed on the
ballot of the June 1982 primary election.')
120
The political campaign for Proposition 8 continued in the
typical manner of such things, with proponents and opponents
seeking as much favorable publicity as possible. The Assembly
Criminal Justice Committee jumped into the fray with a one
hundred-page report severely criticizing Proposition 8, asserting
that the proposition was "unconstitutional, misdrafted, or vaguely
worded," and would provoke "a storm of litigation which could
overwhelm our appellate courts and substantially disrupt the
criminal justice system.' 121
115. Id
116. Id
117. Id at 4, 641 P.2d at 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
118. Id
119. Id at 1,641 P.2d 200, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100.
120. Id at 4, 641 P.2d at 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
121. Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice,Analysis of Proposition 8: The Criminaliustice
Initiative, March 24, 1982, at 68 & 71 (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
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The voters came down heavily on the side of criminal justice
reform with a 56.4% vote of approval for Proposition 8.122 The
initiative was subsequently upheld against various constitutional
challenges in Brosnahan v. Brown."3
The history outlined above shows that the Victims' Bill of
Rights was not simply a flash-in-the-pan development. The
pressures that inspired the proponents of Proposition 8 were a long
time in developing. The proponents first attempted to achieve
criminal justice reform through the legislature; only when that
avenue was effectively blocked and after the success of Proposition
13 did proponents turn seriously to the voter initiative process. That
the proponents were able to focus seriously the electorate's
attention upon the topic of criminal justice reform was itself an
indication of how the public viewed the California Supreme
Court's performance in this field of law during the 1970's.
II. THE QUANTITATIVE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 8
Elsewhere in this volume, Jeff Brown summarizes many of the
qualitative impacts of Proposition 8 from the perspective of a
public defender. 4 Other articles in this volume explore particular
aspects of Proposition 8 in greater detail. This section highlights
very briefly the quantitative impact of Proposition 8 by resort to
the numbers. Bean counting and statistics are no substitute for
qualitative analysis and understanding, but counting the cases may
more effectively communicate the breadth and depth of Proposition
8's many changes.
Probably the single most startling statistic--at least to the
authors--is that Proposition 8 succeeded in abrogating no fewer
than twenty-seven leading cases of the Supreme Court of
122. Jost, Victims of Proposition 8, L.A. Daily J., June 12, 1982, at 3.
123. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 657 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
124. Brown, Proposition 8: Origins and Impact-A Public Defender's Perspective, 23 PAC. LJ.
891 (1992).
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California."m Those leading cases were of course relied upon in
subsequent decisions by the supreme court and by lower courts in
California. In total, there are well over one thousand appellate
cases that were affected by Proposition 8 (and an undetermined
number of superior court rulings). It is a rare piece of legislation
or judicial decision that, in one stroke, accomplishes such a
remarkable result. In the discussion which follows, focusing upon
125. See People v. Barrick, 33 Cal. 3d 115, 654 P.2d 1243, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1982), rev'd,
38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 11, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985); People v. Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616 P.2d
826, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1980), rev'd, 42 Cal. 3d 170, 720 P.2d 913, 228 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1986);
People v. Kurland, 28 Cal. 3d 376, 618 P.2d 213, 168 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1980), rev'd, 50 Cal. 3d 1,784
P.2d 633, 265 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1990); People v. Spearman, 25 Cal. 3d 107, 599 P.2d 74, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 883 (1979), rev'd, 38 Cal. 3d 301,696 P2d 11,211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985); People v. Woodard,
23 Cal. 3d 329, 590 P.2d 391, 152 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1979), rev'd, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 11,211
Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985); People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357,594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979),
questioned by, 222 Cal. App. 3d 612, 271 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1990); People v. Bellecd, 24 Cal. 3d 879,
598 P.2d 473, 157 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979), questioned by, 201 Cal. App. 3d 877, 247 Cal. Rptr. 353
(1988); People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978), rev'd, 39 Cal.
3d 765, 704 P.2d 752, 217 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1985); People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231,578 P.2d 108,
145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978), questioned by, 211 Cal. App. 3d 640, 259 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1989); People
v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595,580 P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978), rev d, 49 Cal. 3d 63,775 P.2d
1042, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1989): People v. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d 67, 583 P.2d 130, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605
(1978), rev'd, 44 Cal. 3d 309,748 P.2d 307,243 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1988); People v. Rollo, 20 Cal. 3d
109, 569 P.2d 771, 141 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1977), rev'd, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 11, 211 Cal. Rptr.
719 (1985); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272,127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976), rev'd 44
Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307,243 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1988); People v. Rist, 16 Cal. 3d 211,545 P.2d 833,
127 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1976), rev'd, 38 CaL 3d 301, 696 P.2d 11,211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985); People
v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 538 P.2d 753, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1975), questioned by, 226 Cal. App.
3d 1630, 277 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1991), review granted, 280 Cal. Rptr. 91, 1991 Cal. LEXIS; 1648
(LEXIS , Cal. library, Cases file) (April 1991); People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79, 539 P.2d 43, 123
Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975), rev'd, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 11, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985); People v.
Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835,533 P.2d 211, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1975), questioned by, 202 Cal. App. 3d 581,
248 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1988); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528,531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975), rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985); People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d
641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 1194, 767 P.2d 1047, 255 Cal. Rptr.
569 (1989); Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77,501 P.2d 234,104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972), rev'd,
50 Cal. 3d 1,784 P.2d 633, 265 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1990); People v. Superior Court (Hawkins), 6 Cal.
3d 757, 493 P.2d 1145, 100 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1972), questioned by, 217 Cal. App. 3d 430, 262 Cal.
Rptr. 640 (1989); People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), rev'd,
486 U.S. 35 (1988); Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971),
rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985); People v. MacPherson, 2 Cal. 3d
109,465 P.2d 17,84 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970), questioned by, 221 Cal. App. 3d 980,270 Cal. Rptr. 730
(1990); People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965), questioned by,
222 Cal. App. 3d 541,271 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1990); People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855
(1955), rev'd, 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.
2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), rev'a 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
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some of Proposition 8's most significant reforms, we show in
numbers the cases that Proposition 8 targeted and the success that
Proposition 8 has had.
The exclusionary rule was one of Proposition 8's primary
targets. California's modem history with the exclusionary rule
began in 1955 when Justice Traynor, writing for a four-justice
majority in People v. Cahan,126 overruled prior decisions to the
contrary and adopted the exclusionary rule in California. 27 The
court created the "vicarious exclusionary rule" the following year
in People v. Martin.121 Cahan has been cited 400 times, and
Martin has been cited 242 times.'29 As noted above, Cahan and
Martin were formally placed upon independent state grounds as a
result of Kaplan v. Superior Court,3 ' People v. Superior Court
(Simon),13' and People v. Brisendine.
3 2
Although Proposition 8 was approved by the voters in June of
1982, many of its effects were not immediate. There is often a lag
between the enactment of new statutory or constitutional provisions
and their full incorporation into the organic law. Proposition 8 also
was held to apply prospectively, with the result that many post-
1982 cases were decided under prior law.133 With Proposition 8,
the lag was approximately three years, and the beginning of its full
incorporation into the law came with the decision in In re Lance
W 134 The issue in In re Lance W. was whether California's
independent exclusionary rule and vicarious exclusionary rule
survived the enactment of Proposition 8.' In a four to three
126. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
127. Id at 448,282 P.2d at 913. At the time Cahan was decided, the federal exclusionary rule
had not yet been imposed upon the states. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The rule was subsequently imposed upon the states in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
128. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
129. These numbers include only decisions from the California Supreme Court and California
Courts of Appeal.
130. 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
131. 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972).
132. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
133. People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251,257,667 P.2d 149, 162, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692,695 (1983).
134. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
135. Id at 879, 694 P.2d at 746, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
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decision authored by Justice Grodin, the court held that Proposition
8 had indeed overruled the Cahan-Martin line of cases, at least
insofar as the cases relied upon the California Constitution.'36 In
the space of only eight years, In re Lance has been cited 295 times.
Figures A-C graphically show how the Cahan-Martin line of cases
have been overwhelmed by Proposition V 37
136. L at 886, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
137. It is interesting to note that in each of the figures, citations to the "old'" cases actually
rose in 1985, the year In re Lance W. was decided. The increase is due to the number of courts which
cite the old case only in order to contrast the old law with Proposition 8. As the rule from a case
becomes incorporated into the fabric of the judicial system, appellate citations to that case will tend
to become less frequent because lower courts will make fewer and fewer mistakes. This tendency can
most clearly be seen in Figure A, where citations to Cahan were most numerous in the few years
after the decision was rendered. After five or six years, the number of citations to Cahan essentially
levelled off at around 10 to 15 cases per year. Citations to In re Lance W. and other Proposition 8
cases will no doubt ultimately show a similar pattern.
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In Harris v. New York,138 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that voluntary, extrajudicial statements elicited in
violation of an accused's Miranda rights could be used to impeach
the accused's testimony at trial. 39 The Supreme Court of
California initially adopted this rule in People v. Nudd 40 Two
years later, however, the court reconsidered Nudd, and in a four to
three decision in People v. Disbrow,' rejected both Harris and
Nudd, citing primarily the compelling need to deter wrongful police
conduct and the likelihood that a jury would use the inculpatory
statements for more than just impeachment purposes.'42 Disbrow
has been cited 127 times.
In People v. May,143 the Supreme Court of California,
adopting the court of appeal's decision, held that Proposition 8 had
overruled People v. Disbrow, and that inculpatory statements
elicited in violation of Miranda could henceforth be used to
impeach the defendant's trial testimony.'44 May has been cited
forty-nine times in only four years. Figure D shows the distribution
of citations for Disbrow and May.
138. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
139. Id at 226.
140. 12 Cal. 3d 204, 208, 524 P.2d 844, 846, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372, 374 (1974).
141. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
142. Id at 111-13, 545 P.2d at 278, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
143. 44 Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1988). •
144. Id at 319, 748 P.2d at 313, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
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FIGURE D
Miranda Violations
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In Lego v. Twomey, 145 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the state had to prove the voluntariness of a confession
only by a preponderance of the evidence.1 46 The Supreme Court
of California rejected that rule in People v. Jimenez,147 imposing
a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard. 14 Jimenez has been cited
152 times. In 1989, Jimenez was declared a dead letter by the court
in People v. Markham.149 Markham has been cited twenty-four
times in its short two-year-plus life. Figure E shows the breakdown
of citations to these two cases.
145. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
146. Id at 479.
147. 21 Cal. 3d 595, 580 P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978).
148. Id at 600, 580 P.2d at 674, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
149. 49 Cal. 3d 63, 65, 775 P.2d 1042, 1043, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 274 (1989).
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Markham is especially significant because it marks the first
time Justice Mosk joined the majority in recognizing the effect of
Proposition 8. Justice Mosk had dissented in both In re Lance W.
and People v. May.150 Justice Mosk's "reluctan[t]" concurring
opinion in Markham communicates his fundamental disagreement
with Proposition 8, which he describes as "retrogressive," as
follows:
[T]he blame for the sorry situation in which we find ourselves must be
placed squarely on Proposition 8. That ill-conceived measure has struck
down California precedents on individual rights as it has encountered
them in its path of destruction. [citations omitted] Jimenez is the latest
casualty -- and regrettably, probably not the last.
151
These are only a few of the cases interpreting Proposition 8's
many provisions. The graphs suggest two conclusions about
Proposition 8. First, Proposition 8 was drafted in response to an
enormous body of law. Proposition 8 was not a reaction to simply
one or two cases; it was a reaction to literally hundreds of
decisions in the appellate reporters (and to the hundreds or
thousands of unreported superior court decisions following the rules
crafted by the appellate courts). Second, Proposition 8 appears
largely to have been successful in remaking the legal landscape.
More cases are on the way. The California Courts of Appeal
are, of course, ahead of the Supreme Court of California in
interpreting Proposition 8. For example, in People v. Superior
Court (Hawkins),52 the court held that a blood test could be
taken only after a suspect had been lawfully arrested. 153 In
People v. Trotman54 and People v. Deltoro,'55 the courts held
150. See People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 320, 748 P.2d 307, 313, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375
(1988) (Mosk, J., dissenting); In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 900,694 P.2d 744,761,210 Cal. Rptr.
631, 648 (1985) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
151. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d at 73, 775 P.2d at 1048, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 279 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
152. 6 Cal. 3d 757, 493 P.2d 1145, 100 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1972).
153. 1L at 764, 493 P.2d at 1149, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
154. 214 Cal. App. 3d 430, 262 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1989).
155. 214 Cal. App. 3d 1417, 263 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1989).
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that Proposition 8 overruled Hawkins; accordingly, the police may
require a blood test prior to arrest if there is probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed for which a blood test would
be relevant, such as driving under the influence. 56
In People v. Shuey,157 the court held that evidence seized
pursuant to a warrant would be suppressed if the premises searched
had been "secured" before the warrant had been obtained. 158 The
court of appeal in People v. Gesner59 held that Shuey was
overruled by Proposition 8 and, in accord with United States
Supreme Court precedent, that a warrant in such circumstances
would be valid if there was an independent source of information
for. the warrant."
In People v. Longwill,1 61 the court held that a full body search
of a person who was not necessarily going to be incarcerated was
impermissible, and evidence found pursuant to such a search must
be suppressed.1 62 The courts in In re Demetrius A. 163 and
People v. Otto 16 held that Proposition 8 overruled Longwill and
that California courts must now follow the federal rule that permits
156. Trotman, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 436, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 644; Deltoro, 214 Cal. App. 3d at
1426-27, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 310. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,296 (1973) (holding that police
were justified in taking scrapings from a suspect's fingernails where probable cause existed to believe
he had committed a murder, even though the suspect was not arrested); Schmerberv. California, 384
U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (holding that an arrestee may be required to take a blood test where probable
existed to believe that the he had been driving under the influence).
157. 13 Cal. 3d 835, 533 P.2d 211, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1975).
158. Id at 851, 533 P.2d at 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
159. 202 Cal. App. 3d 581, 248 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1988).
160. Id. at 592, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 330. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813-14
(1984) (holding that evidence obtained in a search conducted under a valid warrant one day after an
illegal entry was admissible since the information on which the warrant was secured was derived
from a source independent of the illegal entry).
161. 14 Cal. 3d 943, 538 P.2d 753, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1975).
162. Id at 952-53, 538 P.2d at 758-59, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03.
163. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1245, 256 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1989).
164. 226 Cal. App. 3d 1630,277 Cal. Rptr. 596,602-03 (1991), review granted, 280 Cal. Rptr.
91,808 P.2d 234, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 1648 (LEXIS, Cal. library, Cases file) (April 15,1991), reprinted
for tracking pending review, 233 Cal. App. 3d 279 (1991). See supra note 72 and accompanying text
(discussing the Otto decision).
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full body searches following a lawful custodial arrest.1"5 The
Supreme Court of California granted review in People v. Otto on
April 15, 1991.166
Finally, in People v. Aranda,67 the court held that one
defendant's extrajudicial statements that implicate a co-defendant
are inadmissible when both defendants are tried jointly.'68 In
People v. Boyd,16 9 the court held that Proposition 8 overruled
Aranda and that, consistent with the federal rule, such inculpatory
statements are admissible so long as the defendant who made the
extrajudicial statements is available for cross-examination.
170
CONCLUSION
In light of the breadth of issues touched by Proposition 8 and
the sheer number of cases that it overruled, Proposition 8 must be
viewed as a wholesale shift in the philosophy of the criminal
justice system in California. By casting the measure in the form of
an initiative designed to introduce the concept of "victims' rights"
into the criminal justice system, Proposition 8 succeeded in
capturing the attention of the voters, who were obviously
dissatisfied with what they perceived to be an excessive judicial
focus upon the rights of the accused.
171
165. Otto, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 596; Demetrius A., 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1247-48, 256 Cal. Rptr.
at 718-19. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (holding that a police officer was
entitled to make a full search, incident to arrest, of the defendant's person and a cigarette package
found thereupon, even though the officer had no subjective fear that the defendant was armed);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that a search of the defendant's person
and cigarette package found thereupon did not violate the fourth amendment where the officer had
probable cause to arrest the defendant).
166. 280 Cal. Rptr. 91, 808 P.2d 234, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 1648 (LEXIS, Cal. library, Cases file)
(April 15, 1991), reprintedfor tracking pending review, 233 Cal. App. 3d 279 (1991). Otto also held
that Proposition 8 repealed Penal Code section 631(c), which declares inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of its anti-wiretapping provisions. Oto, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
167. 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d at 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 353 (1965).
168. Id at 531, 407 P.2d at 274, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
169. 222 Cal. App. 3d 541, 271 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1990).
170. Id at 563, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 752. See Brton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968)
(holding that admission of a co-defendant's extrajudicial statement inculpating defendant in a joint
trial was error since the co-defendant was unavailable for cross-examination).
171. See supra notes 110-123 and accompanying text (discussing the history of Proposition 8's
enactment).
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Proposition 8 must also be judged successful in meeting the
goals that it set out to accomplish. An enormous number of cases
and rules have been overruled by Proposition 8, and the cases
overruled were exactly the set of cases that created the public
outcry in the 1970's.172 The proponents of the Victims' Bill of
Rights have, on this tenth anniversary, good reason to be proud of
their accomplishment.
879
172. See supra notes 124-170 and accompanying text (discussing the quantitative impact of
Proposition 8).

